GOVERNANCE
Fraud is a complex problem that often extends across sectors and national borders. The approach requires cooperation between sectors (the private, public and government sectors) and across national borders. This is how the Macolin Convention gave rise to the “Group of Copenhagen”, in which each signatory member state sets up a local network in the fight against match fixing.
PrOFS investigated the structures, management and collaborations within various National Platforms against match fixing. Want to know more about this? Read more!
Intro
Government at (inter)national level: The National Platforms
The Council of Europe and the Macolin Convention
The Macolin Convention on the Combating of the Manipulation of Sports Competitions was drawn up within the Council of Europe. This international treaty provides, among other things, for a typology of sports manipulation and for the creation of national platforms to combat the manipulation of sports competitions in all member states of the Council of Europe. The Group of Copenhagen comprises the network in which all the different national platforms come together and exchange information.
The main objective of the National Platforms is to protect the integrity of sport. Specifically, they want to improve the prevention, detection and sanctioning of competition manipulation through cooperation between the police/procuratorate, the sports sector and gambling regulators.
Belgian National Platform to Combat the Manipulation of Sports Competitions
At national level, the National Platforms ensure the coordination of the fight against sports fraud. The platforms work on the prevention, detection and sanctioning of sports fraud and ensure (inter)national information exchange.
The Belgian National Platform is composed of various actors including private, public and government actors (e.g. the communities, sports administrations, sports federations, VSF, BOIC, Federal Police and Public Prosecutor and the Gaming Commission).
What are the vulnerabilities of the Belgian National Platform?
The governance form of the Belgian National Platform is a "Lead Organization Governed network". This means that the coordination of the platform is in the hands of one manager. In Belgium this is the Federal Police. As a result, the network's focus is mainly on detection, somewhat on sanctioning, and less on prevention.
A lead organization governed form of governance has advantages in terms of network stability, but also has vulnerabilities. There is often less trust, control, involvement, and less inflow of knowledge, expertise and resources compared to a more shared form of network leadership.
The Federal Police is the ‘lead organization’ and coordinator in the network. This leads to distrust among some actors. The police are a supervisory authority, which can form a barrier to reporting incidents. The focus of the police is mainly detection, which raises the question of whether the police are the best leaders in a network that is about prevention, detection, and sanctioning.
The network lacks inclusion of key actors such as sports clubs, athlete representatives, gambling regulators and smaller federations. In addition, the network density is low, which means that many collaborations remain unused. Moreover, important actors that can play a role in prevention (e.g. Sportieq) are hardly involved in the network.
The Council of Europe (CoE) plays a limited role as a meta-governor, which also limits the international connection. In addition, there is a lack of international legislation, and there are few connections with other platforms within the Group of Copenhagen. Moreover, the convention has only been ratified to a limited extent, which poses an obstacle to international cooperation.
The National Platform functions largely on goodwill and informal relationships. There is a lack of a formal framework with clear powers and mandates. This limits the capacity of the network and makes it difficult to raise resources, while there is also no operational secretariat. There are little to no financial resources available for the operation of the platform and it relies on the goodwill of members for meetings and logistical support. The members perform their tasks within the network on a voluntary basis. This in addition to their permanent jobs.
There is a lack of adapted regulations, which makes sharing privacy data (and therefore cases) within the network problematic. The platform finds it difficult to sanction violations, because details of ongoing investigations may not be shared within the network as long as the investigation is ongoing. In addition, there is no adapted law for match-fixing, which makes it difficult to effectively prosecute these types of cases under the current criminal law. As a result, the role of the police and the judiciary within the network is limited.
There is a lack of common objectives and shared commitment. There is no clear action plan with priorities, objectives, and responsibilities. Partly because of this, actors remain mainly focused on their own interests.
ProOFS Recommendations
This means that a common understanding must be built up around competition manipulation. Using the Council of Europe (CoE) typology can help to determine the objectives and priorities of the National Platform. It is important to identify individual and shared objectives and clearly define what the role of the network should be in the field of prevention, detection and sanctioning of match fixing. Drawing up a joint annual plan in which the objectives are formulated and providing feedback via an annual report can increase effectiveness. Furthermore, open and inclusive communication and discussion should be pursued, with actors being more closely involved in the operation of the NP. This requires more active input from all actors, as well as clear agreements and agreements that facilitate joint operation, such as memorandums of understanding. Ratifying the convention and introducing (international) legislation are crucial steps to formalize and strengthen the functioning of the National Platform.
We need to work on building trust and developing mutual understanding. Since the police lead the network, it is not always easy for some actors to be completely open. Shared leadership, with more joint responsibility, can improve this. It is also important to develop a sense of relational legitimacy and satisfaction with the collaboration. Currently, everyone still largely works for themselves, but by working together on shared objectives with a clear division of roles, satisfaction with the joint operation can increase. The motivation and positive attitude of the individuals within the network are a strength, but this motivation can be further aligned with the shared objectives.
This requires agreements about the effective development of output within the network. Concrete goals must be set for the development of processes and products, such as alert systems, triage systems and feedback after handling a case. It is important to invest in procedures that make achievements possible, such as amended legislation that facilitates information exchange, as well as the ratification of the convention. Working groups can play an important role in this. Shared leadership is also crucial. The police are currently too central a leader and should be supported by other central actors, such as sports actors and gambling regulators. Shared and changing leadership can ensure that there is more and broader knowledge and expertise in the network and that responsibility is distributed more fairly.
It is also important to develop activities for knowledge building and to be more open to input from non-members, such as universities. There can also be more exchanges with other actors within the Group of Copenhagen (GoC). Finally, resources, including logistical, human, financial and technical resources, must be shared within the network. A minimum of operating resources is necessary, as is a secretariat. External communication and awareness of the NP can be improved via, for example, a website.