PrOFS | sportmanagement24

The PrOFS project is a 4-year multidisciplinary research project, funded by the Flemish government (FWO). Various disciplines (law, criminology, economics, psychology, sports management, and sports pedagogy) approached the complex phenomenon of fraud in sports from the macro (system and legislation), meso (organization) and micro (individual) level. The project aimed at systemic change, which was made possible by the close collaboration between research and practice. Both theoretical insights and useful tools were developed.

Prof. dr. Annick Willem

Department of Movement and Sports Sciences Ghent University

Prof. dr. Leen Haerens

Department of Movement and Sports Sciences UGent

Prof. dr. Alain van hiel

Department of Developmental, Personality and Social Psychology UGent

Prof. dr. Dries Goossens

Department of Policy Informatics and Operational Management Ghent University

Prof. dr. Wim Hardyns

Vakgroep Criminologie, Strafrecht en Sociaal Recht UGent

Prof. dr. Tom Vander Beken

Vakgroep Criminologie, Strafrecht en Sociaal Recht UGent

Prof. Dr. An Vermeersch

Vakgroep Criminologie, Strafrecht en Sociaal Recht UGent

Prof. Dr. Letizia Paoli

Leuvens Instituut voor Criminologie (LINC) KULeuven

Prof. Dr. Bram Constandt

Vakgroep Bewegings- en Sportwetenschappen UGent

Dr. Cleo Schyvinck

Vakgroep Bewegings- en Sportwetenschappen UGent

Gema Souvenir

Vakgroep Bewegings- en Sportwetenschappen UGent

Tassilo Tissot

Vakgroep Ontwikkelings-, Persoonlijkheids- en Sociale Psychologie en Bewegings-

Lucie Vanwersch

Vakgroep Criminologie, Strafrecht en Sociaal Recht UGent

Sofie Gotelaere

Leuvens Instituut voor Criminologie (LINC) KULeuven

Louis Vandercruysse

Vakgroep Criminologie, Strafrecht en Sociaal Recht UGent

Karel Devriesere

Vakgroep Beleidsinformatica en Operationeel Beheer UGent

Rein Struyve

Criminologie, Strafrecht en Sociaal Recht UGent

What is sports-related fraud?

Various types of fraud were examined within the PrOFS project. We call all these types of fraud sports-related fraud. Sports-related is an umbrella term for sports fraud or sports-specific fraud on the one hand. On the other hand, the term also covers ‘classical’ fraud or non-sport specific fraud. Want to know more? Read more!

When it comes to sports fraud - i.e. fraud specific to sport - the PrOFS project focused on competition manipulation.

SPORTS SPECIFIC FRAUD

Types of fraud

NON-SPORT SPECIFIC FRAUD

When it comes to non-sport specific fraud, the PrOFS project focused on financial fraud, misappropriation of funds and corruption.

Types of fraud

RESEARCH THEMES

Recommendations

INTEGRATED MODEL FOR PREVENTING FRAUD IN SPORTS

MICRO LEVEL

Vulnerabilities can occur at the individual level

VULNERABILITIES

ProOFS research shows that unpaid or poorly paid athletes are more likely to participate in gambling-related match fixing. Referees, agents and board members also often have underlying financial motivations to commit sports fraud (Struyve et al., 2024).   
ProOFS research shows that sporting motivations are often the basis of non-gambling related match-fixing. However, these sporting motivations are often related to additional financial motivations, for example when avoiding promotion, extra premiums can be earned the following season (Vanwersch, Vandercruysse et al., 2024).  
ProOFS research shows that, among other factors, gambling addictions often underlie the financial problems of athletes (Struyve et al., 2024). The literature shows that athletes conduct a cost-benefit analysis when deciding whether or not to engage in match-fixing. However, this analysis is strongly influenced by addictions, such as gambling addiction (Vanwersch et al., 2022). 
ProOFS research shows that gambling-related match-fixing is often accompanied by criminal organizations that pressure or intimidate athletes and/or trainers to force them to participate in match-fixing (Struyve et al., 2024).  
ProOFS research shows that social motivations at a micro level can also underlie non-gambling related match-fixing. Research in tennis and football showed that motivations for committing non-gambling match-fixing often have to do with friendships, or helping the opponent to achieve a sporting goal (Vanwersch, Vandercruysse et al., 2024).  
Individual perceptions can increase the motivation to commit fraud. For example, PrOFS research shows that athletes are more likely to accept fraudulent practices if they perceive their club as more competitive compared to other clubs (Tissot et al, forthcoming).

ProFS research shows that the personal (financial) expertise of board members can create opportunities to commit fraud (for example financial fraud). Our research also shows that certain positions have more opportunities to commit certain types of sports fraud, for example, board members more often have the opportunity to commit non-sports-specific fraud, such as financial fraud.

Nevertheless, PrOFS research shows that some sports clubs often do not (yet) have the necessary capacity and knowledge to meet the sometimes complex legal requirements (Gotelaere & Paoli, 2024). This does not only apply to small sports clubs. For example, it appears that a number of professional football clubs, which have been subject to preventive anti-money laundering legislation since 2021, are still insufficiently equipped to meet the obligations of this legislation (Gotelaere et al., forthhoming). 
ProOFS research shows that sports fraud in Flanders has a significant dark number. PrOFS research showed that various functions within the Flemish sports world are not inclined to report these incidents, or are not aware of the available reporting points (Vanwersch et al., forthcoming). Both literature and PrOFS research show that criminal investigations into sports fraud often start by chance (Struyve et al., 2024). Sport enjoys many positive functions in society, politicians and the prosecuting authorities do not want to discourage them from a policy point of view. Sport is also regarded as an influential instrument for politicians (Whannel, 2008). Such characteristics can lead to politicians or policymakers being reluctant to openly address fraud and other malpractices in sports (Gotelaere & Paoli, 2024). 
PrOFS research shows that criminal connections within the sports world ensure that people can benefit from each other's financial structures (Struyve et al., 2024; Vanwersch & Hardyns, 2024).
ProOFS research shows that people tend to view violations at their own club as less serious than when the same action takes place at other clubs (Tissot et al., 2024a [under review]). Such double standards can create a climate in which unethical behavior is (implicitly) encouraged to give one's own club an advantage. 
Diffusion of responsibility means that it is not clear who has responsibility in a given situation (for example, to take action against fraud). This diffuses responsibility and makes it less likely that an individual will take responsibility for taking action (Latane & Darley, 1968). PrOFS research shows that lack of responsibility is one of the main reasons why people would not take action against fraudulent practices (Tissot et al., forthcoming).

ProOFS research and the literature show that morality dampens various types of unethical behavior within sport, including fraud. The more important it is for an individual to be a moral person, the lower the likelihood that this person would commit fraud (Kavussanu & Ring, 2017; Tissot et al., 2024a [under review]). PrOFS research shows the interconnectedness of gambling with the sports sector, and that this affects the morality of athletes (Struyve et al., 2024; Vanwersch & Hardyns, 2024). The literature shows that moral approval of fraud has an influence on the prevention of fraud. Participating in fraud, in turn, influences the moral approval of fraud (Hurst et al., 2024). 
The literature shows that individuals use different rationalizations to explain unethical behavior. This is a natural process to counteract cognitive dissonance (the nagging difference between attitudes and behavior) and feelings of guilt. In this context, the concept of moral disengagement (Bandura, 1996) is particularly well known. It describes eight different species
thought patterns that individuals use to morally distance themselves. Examples include advantageous comparisons (“Fraud is much worse in other sectors than in sports”), euphemistic labeling (“This is just a small push in the right direction”), distortion of consequences (“This has
almost no influence on the competition”), etc...
ProOFS research shows that lack of responsibility is one of the main reasons why people would not take action against fraudulent practices (Tissot et al., forthcoming)

RECOMMENDATIONS

On a micro level, we can only appeal to the self-discipline of each individual to adhere to an existing ethical culture and encourage everyone to take on an exemplary role. These encouragements at the micro level can be done by focusing on a (de)normalization of fraudulent behavior, career advice and guidance.

The literature shows that responsibility management -
through clear role definitions, accountability mechanisms and leadership - can be a way to counteract responsibility diffusion (Brown & Treviño, 2006; Karau & Williams, 1993; Latané & Darley, 1970). 
The literature shows that identifying and punishing double standards is crucial for maintaining integrity and ethical behavior. This can be achieved, for example, through ethics audits, clear policies, accountability of leaders and monitoring compliance with ethical codes (Kaptein, 1998; Ferrell et al., 2016). 
PrOFS researchers used the scientific insights around morality to create an evidence-based workshop for individual athletes. See Tools

MESO LEVEL

Vulnerabilities can occur within (sports) organizations

VULNERABILITIES

Sports clubs can participate in match fixing, for example, to avoid relegation or promotion, because of friendships, or for practical reasons (e.g. to avoid long travel times). PrOFS research also shows that sporting motivations underlie various other forms of fraud in sports, such as license fraud or subsidy fraud. By engaging in such fraud, clubs can have more financial resources. These resources can be used to attract better athletes or trainers, for example by promising them higher compensation or better equipment. This gives the fraudulent clubs a competitive advantage over clubs that stick to the rules (Gotelaere & Paoli, forthcoming). 
ProOFS research shows that clubs in financial difficulties were particularly motivated to accept criminal external investments. In this way they could obtain a license or avoid bankruptcy (Struyve et al., 2024). Our research also shows that financial motivations can play a role in several other forms of fraud in sports. For example, it was found that receiving higher compensation or retaining benefits is a motivation for committing various types of fraud in sports, such as tax fraud or social security fraud, and that even money laundering can be linked to this (Gotelaere & Paoli, forthcoming). 
Sports-related fraud can be politically motivated (e.g., fraud involving the rights to organize sports mega-events). Concrete examples of political motivations that can lead to fraud include: using sport as propaganda (e.g., sport washing, integrity washing of a certain political regime/ideology), using sport as a diplomatic weapon (e.g., sport as ‘soft power’), guaranteeing (financial) benefits for certain regions; personal benefits for politicians/parties...
Fraud can also be committed out of 'convenience', in other words out of 'ease'. This means that goals (sporting, financial) are achieved in the most efficient way possible (with a minimum of time, effort and resources). Unnecessary burdens are avoided as much as possible. 'Convenience' also helps us to explain why deviant paths are chosen over legal alternatives. In this case, the motivation for fraud can simply be that it is easier to pay a trainer illegally, for example, than to handle all bureaucratic, administrative matters correctly (Gottschalk, 2018; Souvenir et al. [forthcoming]).

PrOFS research, as well as the literature, shows that a lack of transparency, the complexity of governance structures, and a lack of ethical standards within the governance of sports organizations offer opportunities for (financial) fraud (Nelen, 2022; Struyve et al., 2024; Souvenir et al., 2023)
An organization's ethical culture refers to how well or poorly an organization is able to enforce ethical behavior among its members (Kaptein, 2008; 2020). Ethical cultures consist of several dimensions, including clear rules, achievable goals, and member support. PrOFS research shows that ethical cultures are the most important indicators for various forms of sports-related fraud. In sports organizations with a weak ethical culture, significantly more cases of fraud were reported (Souvenir et al., forthcoming). 
Related to the ethical culture is the normalization of fraud within (sports) organizations. The culture influences the extent to which fraudulent behavior is accepted, socialized and internalized within a (sports) organization (Geeraert, 2018). Research by Van Der Hoeven et al. (2022) shows that certain forms of match-fixing were generally normalized in cycling under the guise of tactics. PrOFS research also shows that there is a great tolerance for other types of fraud, in particular social and fiscal fraud (Gotelaere & Paoli, 2024). It also turned out that 1 in 2 sports clubs pays their members undeclared, and that 44% indicate that they do not consider this serious (Souvenir et al., 2024). When there is little or no response to fraud, it is seen as 'normal' and becomes more ingrained in sports.
Ethical leadership is typically understood as the display and promotion of normatively appropriate behavior through actions and interpersonal relationships (Brown et al., 2005). PrOFS research shows that less fraud occurs in sports clubs as ethical leadership is better assessed (Souvenir et al., forthcoming).  
The literature indicates that convenience is an important driver of fraud. Convenience means achieving goals with the least possible time, effort and resources, while avoiding unnecessary burdens. Convenience is therefore not necessarily negative, but it can help explain why illegitimate paths are preferred over legitimate paths (Gottschalk, 2018). PrOFS findings show that this mechanism plays a particular role in various forms of tax and social fraud. This fraud is often the result of conscious attempts to gain an unfair advantage, but can also arise from ignorance of the often complex tax, social security and labor legislation. Due to the efforts required to comply with this legislation, sports organizations may be inclined to opt for ‘convenience’ to engage in tax or social fraud rather than opt for legitimate practices (Gotelaere & Paoli, 2024). 
The way in which a competition is planned can pose risks of fraud, in particular match fixing. PrOFS research (Devriesere et al., forthcoming) identified six risk indicators.

1) Asymmetric interests: This means that two athletes or teams play against each other, but the match result is only important for one team. The other team has, as it were, nothing to lose by winning or losing, and can potentially be ‘bribed’ become.

2) Common interests: These can occur when both teams have an interest in a certain score, for example when they both need to score x number of points to advance to the next round.

3) Community Interests: These arise when we can group athletes/teams based on a common characteristic. For example, two athletes from the same country in an international competition may agree on results or deliberately lose as their compatriot has a greater chance of ultimately winning.

4) Choosing a preferred opponent is a risk that can also occur during tournaments. This means that athletes will deliberately lose matches – usually in the group stage – to move into the next phase – the knockout phase – of a tournament against a ‘weaker’ opponent.

5) Transferring desired results in a tournament. Sometimes only some of the points achieved advance to the next phase of the tournament. The risk here is that athletes/teams benefit from intentional losses. By losing deliberately, a team can influence which teams finish in the top four or not and thus also influence the points transferred.

6) Long distance travel: When a team deliberately loses in order not to be promoted to a competition in which it sees an increase in travel distances.
In sports with multiple federations, disciplinary measures can easily be circumvented by athletes switching to another federation within the same sport (Struyve et al., forthcoming).
Private academies prove difficult to check for fraud, which increases the risk of misunderstandings. This situation calls for stricter regulations to ensure supervision and integrity within these academies and tournaments (Struyve et al., forthcoming).

Although control mechanisms are important for preventing fraud in the sports sector, some nuance is appropriate. PrOFS research indicates that control mechanisms mainly play an indirect role in fraud prevention, namely through their impact on the ethical culture within the organization. It is crucial that there is sufficient support for these controls within the organization. In addition, there is a risk when compliance with ethical guidelines only becomes a formal matter, in which no one actually feels involved (i.e., ‘checking the box mentality’). The success of management controls therefore strongly depends on the ethical culture. On the other hand, an ethical culture can be difficult to enforce when there are no clear rules or sanctions.
Research shows that privately organizing a sports tournament can encourage fraud, because of the few checks and balances involved (Struyve et al., forthcoming).

RECOMMENDATIONS

ProOFS research and literature show that financial conditions for athletes, for example, can make players less inclined to commit fraud (Struyve et al., 2024).
Provide (enforceable) internal (disciplinary) regulations in which rules are stated in an unambiguous manner. Also provide procedures to deal with non-compliance with the agreements. Make sure that themes related to fraud are also explicitly included in these regulations. As a manager, pay sufficient attention to raising awareness about ethical topics, including fraud. This contributes to the transparency of the organization.
The PrOFS research team developed a Fraud Perception Index. This is a measuring instrument that can determine per federation which types of fraud occur, who is involved, how morally acceptable fraud is perceived, whether and where it is reported, etc. These insights can help and motivate sports federations to develop/implement a policy regarding fraud prevention.

A weak ethical culture increases the risk of sports-related fraud (Souvenir et al., 2023). However, sports organizations can counteract this by investing in a strong ethical culture. The following PrOFS recommendations are therefore important to ensure an ethical organizational culture within sports clubs:
Clearly state why fraud is not okay within the club
Communicate openly about tax and social obligations
Communicate within the board about (new) laws and regulations
Encourage open discussion about fraud
Take reports or rumors seriously
Be alert to (integrity) problems and do not tolerate them in the sports club
Denormalize fraud
Weak ethical leadership increases the risk of unethical behavior of all kinds (Kaptein, 2008). By focusing on ethical leadership, sports organizations can help prevent fraud from occurring in the sports organization. The following PrOFS recommendations are therefore important to ensure ethical leadership within sports clubs:

Always act in accordance with the principles of good governance

As a leader, set a good example of ethical behavior

Be proactive regarding the topic of fraud, prevention is better than cure.

Create the necessary capacity (resources, processes, structures) to discuss and prevent fraud

Take proactive action to shield athletes from external pressure
An unstable financial situation at sports clubs or athletes can lead to an increased vulnerability to various forms of sports-related fraud (Gotelaere & Paoli, in press). The following PrOFS recommendations are therefore important to guarantee the financial integrity of a sports club:

Financial transparency and knowledge: Ensure transparency in finances and make them manageable, including by working with a budget

Accept money and gifts only ‘digital’, refuse cash payments

Invoice all payments from sponsors and save them in an overview

Work with fixed sponsorship contracts and packages, regardless of playing results

Ensure clear agreements regarding the influence of sponsors on daily management

Avoid gambling-related sponsors as much as possible

Ensure correct and timely compensation for athletes and any other members

Monitor financial sustainability by focusing on long-term objectives

Be responsible, by meeting obligations to pay taxes and social contributions
PrOFS research shows the importance of a transparent structure and control mechanisms in fraud prevention. This mainly occurs through its influence on the culture in the sports organization (Souvenir et al., 2023). The following PrOFS recommendations are therefore important to ensure a transparent structure and control mechanisms within a sports club:

Work with standardized procedures (‘playbooks’) for how important decisions are made

Use the four-eye principle: organize supervision and control of agreements and cash flows with at least two people

State the consequences of committing fraud clearly in the disciplinary regulations

Make it clear what the procedures are and where fraud can be reported

Provide training on the different forms of fraud and have it completed by all members

Provide an accessible point of contact
PrOFS research points to a number of vulnerabilities in the framework of performance and dealing with athletes within a sports club. The following recommendations are therefore important in creating clear agreements regarding performance and athletes within sports clubs:

Ensure timely reimbursements to athletes, other club members, and third parties

Make sure that the financial resources for youth work and those for the A-team remain separate

Work with fixed fee contracts and packages, independent of playing results

Point out the importance of correctly reporting activities to the competent authorities. This way, the club's members are properly protected in the event of illness or accident, and the club avoids (high) financial fines in the event of an audit.

Be alert to situations where teams or individuals have nothing to lose (sportively and/or financially)

Be careful with information you share regarding a competition, for example about injured people

Report concerns about competition scheduling to the federation or tournament organizer

Point out the dangers of gambling, match fixing and sports fixing
PrOFS research (Devriesere et al., forthcoming) shows that dynamic competition planning best addresses match-fixing risks. This dynamic planning ideally takes the form of the Swiss tournament. In a Swiss tournament the number of teams is greater than the minimum number of matches per team. In other words, each team plays the same number of matches, but they only play against some of their potential opponents. The matches are always determined on the basis of the results achieved in the previous matches. This usually means that teams of similar levels play against each other. If dynamic planning is not an option, one can work with predetermined schedules, depending on the strength of the teams.
ProFS research shows that private academies are more difficult to check for fraud. It is therefore recommended to introduce stricter rules for private academies and independent tournaments.
Multiple federations within one sport can lead to circumvention of disciplinary measures, because athletes can switch to another federation within the same sport (Struyve et al., 2024). The recommendation is to create one umbrella federation for all disciplines.

Formal guidelines should be drawn up within an organization that, among other things, describe acceptable behavior. PrOFS research shows the importance of regular updates and communication by management as key conditions for guaranteeing the effectiveness of this measure.

Good governance includes ethical leadership, transparency and accountability within an organization. It sets the tone at the top, promotes a culture of honesty and integrity and provides overview, allowing fraud to be detected and prevented. The literature points out, among other things, the importance of involving independent (board) members.

Legislation and regulations must set limits on acceptable behavior. Compliance with laws and regulations ensures that organizations operate within legal boundaries and that violations can have significant consequences, discouraging fraudulent behavior.
Education and training. Provide members with knowledge and skills in recognizing and preventing fraud. Informed members are better able to recognize warning signs of fraud and know how to respond, improving the organization's overall fraud prevention capabilities.

Promoting ethical culture. Promoting values such as honesty, integrity and responsibility within the organization. A strong ethical culture can discourage unethical behavior, including fraud, because employees internalize these values and are less likely to engage in or tolerate fraudulent activity.

Awareness campaigns. (Public) initiatives aimed at increasing knowledge of fraud risks. Such campaigns can raise society's awareness about the threats and consequences of fraud
Internal controls can reduce the likelihood of fraud by creating checks and balances that make it difficult for individuals to commit fraud without being detected.

Internal auditscan independently evaluate the effectiveness of, among other things, internal controls and governance processes. Internal audits help identify vulnerabilities and provide recommendations for improvement, improving the organization's ability to detect and prevent fraud.

A whistleblowing policy can enable members to report suspected fraud confidentially and without fear of retaliation. Whistleblowing schemes can encourage members to report fraud, allowing fraudulent activity to be detected and remedied more quickly.

Independent audits conducted by third parties can assess the accuracy of financial statements and the effectiveness of internal controls. External audits provide an unbiased assessment of the organization's financial health and fraud risks and help uncover fraudulent activity that internal audits may miss.
An immediate response from the organization to detected fraud, including investigation and crisis management, should not be delayed. A quick and decisive response to fraud limits its impact and sends a strong signal that fraud will not be tolerated, discouraging future fraudulent behavior.

Prosecution holds fraudsters accountable, and can thus emphasize the seriousness of the fraud.

Sanctionsshould be imposed on individuals or organizations found guilty of fraud. Fines, dismissal or legal consequences may be appropriate sanctions.

Under the preventive AML regime, Belgian professional football clubs are expected to set up internal control mechanisms to comply with legal requirements, such as the know your client (KYC) and the know your transaction (KYT) checks. How these checks are actually carried out is up to the clubs themselves.
Ethics programs can be interpreted as a series of control mechanisms consisting of different branches (e.g., code of ethics, regulations of conduct, ethical training/education, sanctioning policy, integrity contact point/reporting point...). Ethics programs are essential for promoting transparency, clarity of rules and openness in discussing ethical (and fraud-related) topics. Kaptein (2015) found that organizations that had highly implemented ethics programs exhibited less unethical behavior than those without such programs. However, PrOFS research shows that ethics programs only play a mediating role in the relationship between ethical organizational cultures and fraud prevention, i.e., having ethics programs will strengthen the link between ethical culture and fraud prevention, but ethics programs in themselves have no direct significant relationship with fraud prevention (Souvenir et al., [forthcoming]).
Tighter control over the organization of tournaments can ensure that only officially recognized stakeholders are involved.
PrOFS researchers developed an evidence-based e-learning and self-evaluation instrument for sports club administrators to prevent match fixing and black money in sports clubs.

MACRO LEVEL

Vulnerabilities can occur in (sports) systems and legislation

VULNERABILITIES

The literature shows that investments in sports are often driven by commercial purposes and a focus on profit maximization rather than competitive balance. This drive for profit can lead to financial mismanagement, which increases the risk of fraud within the sports world (Manoli & Antonopoulos, 2022). However, the focus on short-term results with regard to the sporting aspect can also encourage fraud.
PrOFS research and the leading literature show that structural imbalance in the remuneration of athletes/teams creates a competitive imbalance. This means that smaller teams can no longer be competitive, which increases the motivation to commit fraud (Struyve et al., 2024; Gotelaere & Paoli, 2024; Hill, 2010).

PrOFs research (Vandercruysse et al., forthcoming) as well as the literature makes a distinction between the regular and the irregular gambling sector. The regular gambling sector has transformed in recent years into a sector in which bets can be placed on various parts of a match. Technological developments have also lowered the barriers to gambling. The ban on gambling in some parts of the United States and most of the Asian countries has led to the rise of the irregular gambling sector. Furthermore, the high liquidity in the gambling sector ensures that criminal organizations can bet relatively high amounts without attracting unwanted attention (Brooks et al., 2013; Forrest, et al., 2017; Holden, 2020). 

The general vulnerability to match fixing that sports betting entails – i.e. the mere possibility of betting on sports matches can give rise to gambling-related match fixing – is furthermore reinforced by developments in the supply. You can also bet on the course of the game (e.g. number of yellow cards, penalties, fouls, etc.). These developments are exploited by match-fixers, who can manipulate the course of a match more easily and in a more subtle way than the end result. In addition, participating in sports betting is more prevalent – and even normalized – within sports clubs than in the general population. Problematic gambling is also more common among sports players than among sports players
general population. These individual vulnerabilities can therefore also give rise to (lone wolf) match fixing. 
PrOFS research shows that the commercialization and globalization of the sports sector has increased its susceptibility to fraud. The evolution of sport into a global sector has led to greater (financial) interests, which make fraud more attractive as there is more profit to be made from it (Vandercruysse et al., forthcoming).

Globalization can also be linked to human trafficking in the context of athlete transfers. In addition, the internationalization of the transfer market has encouraged the rise of (private) academies. By keeping the costs of running the academy low (e.g. through substandard training facilities, unqualified trainers) and selling the athletes at a premium to (foreign) clubs, academy operators can pursue significant financial gain (Vandercruysse et al., forthcoming). 
The growing commercialization of the sports sector is accompanied by an increase in large financial transactions in sports (Beech & Chadwick, 2013). These transactions are – from an economic perspective – are not always rational and are often volatile in nature, which also makes the sport vulnerable to fraud (Appermont & Bull, 2023). 
PrOFS research, as well as the leading literature, shows that athlete transfers and associated financial transactions – i.e. transfer fees and brokerage fees – are often characterized by a lack of transparency. In this context, the lack of a clear and coherent legal and regulatory framework is regularly pointed out, which may increase the risk of fraudulent behavior, including money laundering. This lack of transparency may be reinforced by the social role of sport and its negative influence on people's willingness to report illegal activities (e.g. financial fraud) to the competent organizations and/or authorities (Gotelaere & Paoli, in press; Gotelaere et al., forthcoming; Vandercruysse et al., forthcoming). 
PrOFS research shows that match fixing in a broad sense affects the integrity and credibility of the sport (Vanwersch et al., 2024). When individuals are guilty of match fixing, one must respond appropriately and sanction those involved appropriately. The sanctioning options are divided into two possible routes: on the one hand, the criminal route and on the other hand, the disciplinary route via the sports federations. PrOFS research points to the importance of a sound design for both routes, in the sense that cases of match fixing that one wants to punish can actually give rise to appropriate sanctions. When the design of the applicable criminal legislation and disciplinary regulations does not or only partially allows the actors involved to be appropriately punished, exploitation of the legal gaps is encouraged (Vandercruysse & Baert, 2022). 
Refers to the practice whereby one investor, an individual or a legal entity, owns shares in two or more sports clubs. More strictly defined, multiple-club ownership refers to a single investor owning more than 50% of the shares in two or more clubs (Andreff, 2019). PrOFS research shows that multi-club ownership poses significant risks of fraud. Owning multiple clubs can lead to conflicts of interest, with owner decisions favoring one club over another, which can undermine the fairness of the competition. There is also an increased risk of match-fixing, as one owner can influence the outcome of matches between clubs he owns. Owners of multiple clubs can also facilitate transfers of players between these clubs at ‘inflated’ or ‘deflated’ prices. This way they can manipulate the FFP rules, and this can even be linked to money laundering. There is also a risk of tax fraud, and more specifically transfer pricing fraud. Player transfer fees can be manipulated to artificially shift profits between clubs, in order to reduce taxable profits in one country and shift profits to a club in a country with a lower tax burden (Vandercruysse et al., forthcoming). 
PrOFS research shows that athlete default, i.e. late, partial or non-payment of athletes' salaries, increases the risk of match-fixing as athletes become more vulnerable to being approached with match-fixing proposals on the one hand and giving in to such proposals on the other (Vandercruysse et al., 2024).  
Criminal infiltration involves the situation where criminals are somehow active in the sports world. PrOFS research shows that criminals can, for example, invest in a sports club to acquire a majority stake in that club or become active as a sports agent. Holding a certain (professional) role in sport can create a situation of dependency that criminals can exploit (Vanwersch & Hardyns, 2024). It's a more subtle way to infiltrate the sport than working from the outside and using threats or violence. Infiltration of criminals therefore leads to an increased risk of fraudulent practices such as match fixing, but also financial fraud and human trafficking (Gotelaere & Paoli, in press).

ProOFS research shows that inefficient public-private partnerships (for example between federations and the public prosecutor's office) can entail vulnerabilities to fraud (Vandercruysse et al., 2022). For example, inefficient cooperation between federations and the public prosecutor's office can influence the feeling of impunity for fraud (Struyve et al., forthcoming).
PrOFS research shows that there are vulnerabilities in the way the Belgian National Platform is structured and governed (Schyvinck et al. 2024):

The governance form that is used is a “Lead Organization Governed (LOG) network”. This means that coordination is in the hands of one leader. This has advantages in terms of efficiency and stability of the network, but also has disadvantages. For example, there is often less involvement of other actors, as well as less inflow of knowledge, expertise and resources compared to a more shared form of network leadership. 

In the Belgian National Platform (NP), the police function as the central actor within the network. As a result, the focus of the NP is mainly on detection, somewhat on sanctioning, and less on prevention. This means that some actors lack confidence and have a reactive or passive attitude. The police are seen as a controlling body, which may form a barrier to reporting incidents. 

The density of the network is low. Many potential collaborations between actors within the network are not realized or remain underutilized. In addition, certain actors that have an important task in combating fraud, only a limited role in the network. This has negative consequences for the prevention and detection of fraud.

In terms of inclusion in the network, certain actors/sectors are not sufficiently represented, such as sports clubs, athletes' representatives, gambling regulators and smaller federations.

There is only a limited international connection. The Council of Europe (CoE) plays a limited role as meta-governor. International legislation is lacking, and there are few connections with actors from other platforms within the Group of Copenhagen (GoC). The Macolin Convention has had only limited ratification, which poses an obstacle to international cooperation. 

There is a lack of formal structure. The operation of the NP partly depends on the goodwill of individuals because a formal framework with clear powers and mandates is lacking. This is one of the reasons why raising resources is made more difficult.

There is a lack of resources and capacity within the network, and there is no operational secretariat. In addition, there are little to no financial resources available for the operation of the network.

There are vulnerabilities in the legislation that make cooperation difficult. Because Article 14bis has not been amended for match fixing, it is difficult to effectively prosecute cases under the current criminal law. There is also a lack of appropriate legislation regarding the sharing of privacy data. Discussing cases within the network is therefore difficult. Sanctioning violations is a difficult goal for the NP to achieve, as details of ongoing cases cannot be shared within the network while the investigation is still ongoing. 

Relationships are little multiplex. In the current structure, collaboration is limited to sharing information. Partly due to the lack of clarity regarding common objectives and priorities, the informal structure and central leadership, joint action and concrete output are only achieved to a limited extent.

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PrOFS research shows that specific legislation for sports fraud can strengthen the role of the police and the judiciary within the network. For example, match fixing could be specifically criminalized to facilitate criminal prosecution - even though the current framework already provides for a number of non-specific legal grounds that can be applied - and this could have a positive impact on the role of the police and the judiciary.

Legislative initiatives relating to:

Concerning the link between sports betting and match fixing, various legislative initiatives are conceivable. For example, the Belgian criminal law framework (via the Gaming Act) provides sanctions for individuals who gamble on competitions insofar as they themselves can influence the outcome or course of those competitions. Sports federations can also impose a ban in their disciplinary regulations on athletes, among others, from participating in sports betting that applies to the competitions in which they participate. Both legal actions therefore provide for consequences for, among other things, lone-wolf match fixing. At the same time, the government must identify gamblers, both offline and online, so that, for example, athletes can be banned or excluded from bets relating to their competitions. Furthermore, spot fixing can be prevented by limiting the range of legal sports bets. Spot fixing as a specific type of match fixing is difficult to detect and requires less far-reaching actions from those involved, but is nevertheless very lucrative. By limiting the supply on the legal market, the risk of spot fixing can possibly be reduced.
Quality requirements and protection measures regarding private academies: sports federations can impose qualitative criteria on private academies, in particular regarding (sports) infrastructure and sporting training of (underage) athletes. In addition, protection measures can be provided for (underage) athletes who join a private academy. Ideally, the same conditions are provided – e.g. providing academic or vocational training, quality coaches, accommodation, ... – such as those provided for academies affiliated with sports clubs that do fall under the jurisdiction of the sports federation. If the private academy does not allow supervision by the sports federation, the sports federation can order clubs and other sports actors under its jurisdiction (e.g. sports agents) not to do business in or with the private academy.

Transparency measures following the international movement of athletes: Sports federations may participate in a trial period before, during and after the international movement of an athlete in the context of a transfer, … gather information and provide procedures that protect athletes from situations of abuse/exploitation. This may consist of: (i) preliminary check/checks (request information and evidence about: identity of athlete, identity of responsible supervisor, club(s) involved, travel information, content of (employment) agreement, accommodation and reception; provision of protective measures: contact point at sports federation, prior contact with athlete; reporting); (ii) inspection/checks during stay within jurisdiction (contact with athlete in person to check the situation (compliance with agreements, treatment by club, accommodation and reception, …; reporting); and (iii) inspection/checks after the end of the stay period (check on safe return to home country or further travel by contact with athlete, club, responsible supervisor and competent sports federation in another jurisdiction).
External financial transparency: Countering financial fraud requires measures that increase transparency on financial transactions (such as payments of transfer fees or brokerage fees). This can be done on the one hand by requesting information/details of closed deals supported by evidence (sports clubs involved, sports agents, athletes, sums of money transferred or yet to be transferred and for what services, etc.) and on the other hand by thorough control by the sports federation and government on financial transactions, as self-reporting by the actors involved alone is not sufficient. Sports agents can also be subject to operating rules: for example, there must be: (i) transparency to the client about: income/costs for which reimbursement is requested, offers that concern the client, …; (ii) transparency towards sports federation/government about: income and related services (representation agreements), clients, …

Internal (financial) transparency or due diligence: Requiring sports actors, in particular sports clubs and sports agents, to exercise a certain degree of care in their business relationships with other sports actors can lead to the prevention of financial fraud (internal transparency, i.e. between potential contractual parties). This presupposes that sports actors themselves assess the risk of one or more transactions before executing them. Ideally, this should also include a form of external transparency, in the sense that identified problems are reported to competent authorities who can conduct further investigations themselves.

Both internal and external transparency in the context of sports agency services can contribute to the prevention of exploitative practices. After all, transparency entails a certain protection of athletes in their professional relationships with sports agents. Clear financial agreements and external transparency benefit the position of the athlete.
The sanctioning options for match fixing are divided into two possible routes: on the one hand, the criminal route and on the other hand, the disciplinary route via the sports federations. As mentioned above, the design of the legislation and regulations can provide actors with the opportunity to commit match-fixing offenses without being punished. Consequently, government and federations must (i) be clear in which conduct they consider punishable and (ii) ensure that all conduct lends itself to sanctions under the applicable legislative and regulatory framework. With regard to the criminal law response to cases of match fixing, it should ideally be the same across sports, i.e. the criminal law response does not differ depending on the type of sport – e.g. individual sport vs. team sport. Considering the private bribery article in Belgium; is seen as the standard article for match fixing in Belgium; can also be prosecuted criminally, and there are a number of application problems (due to the fact that the person bribed must have a certain professional position in relation to another person; and due to the without knowledge and without authorization requirement) which means that not all match fixing is tackled criminally in the same way. Even though other criminal law grounds are possible, the legislator could opt to either (i) amend the existing private bribery article to eliminate the gaps, which is not obvious and may have undesirable consequences for other sectors, or (ii) insert a specific match-fixing article into the criminal law. Both the criminal law and the disciplinary response must take into account the characteristics of match fixing and/or the sport in order to prevent potential and unwanted gaps in the legislation. A sound criminal and disciplinary framework also goes hand in hand with the perception of sports actors about what is and is not against the rules – be it criminal or disciplinary – is. Providing proper sanctioning options, both criminal and disciplinary, is therefore crucial in the fight against match fixing.
Restricting access to the market for (potential) investors and sports agents by imposing professional and qualitative standards. Imposing professional and qualitative standards for (potential) investors and sports agents – for example by means of “fit-and-proper-person tests” – includes an overall assessment of character, integrity, financial position, professional skills, … of an individual. The evaluation may include various aspects such as legal issues (e.g. involvement in financial irregularities etc.), criminal records and general and professional suitability to be involved in the management and/or management of a sports club or agency. Ideally, the standards transcend national borders so that the fight against criminal infiltration is uniform across national borders.
Related to professional and quality standards, sports federations can reduce multi-club ownership to ensure the integrity of their competitions, at least where sports clubs with the same (part) owner can compete against each other in the same competition. This requires that sports federations must be aware of the ownership structures of sports clubs and request and review this information at regular intervals.
Sports federations monitor the extent to which athletes are paid on time and in full by their employers. Sports federations provide measures that limit the expenditure of sports clubs according to their financial capabilities in order to minimize financial problems and prevent athletes' default. Where non-payment of athletes is identified, sports federations provide measures/sanctions that, on the one hand, ensure the integrity of the competition and, on the other hand, induce the employer to prioritize payment of employees over other expenses. For example, planned competitions with affected athletes can be postponed, temporary transfer bans can be imposed, ...

Efficient cooperation between federations and law enforcement can ensure that fraud can be tackled and controlled in a more efficient manner.
This means that a common understanding must be built up around competition manipulation. Using the Council of Europe (CoE) typology can help to determine the objectives and priorities of the National Platform. It is important to identify individual and shared objectives and clearly define what the role of the network should be in the field of prevention, detection and sanctioning of match fixing. Drawing up a joint annual plan in which the objectives are formulated and providing feedback via an annual report can increase effectiveness. Furthermore, open and inclusive communication and discussion should be pursued, with actors being more closely involved in the operation of the NP. This requires more active input from all actors, as well as clear agreements and agreements that facilitate joint operation, such as memorandums of understanding. Ratifying the convention and introducing (international) legislation are crucial steps to formalize and strengthen the functioning of the National Platform.
We need to work on building trust and developing mutual understanding. Since the police lead the network, it is not always easy for some actors to be completely open. Shared leadership, with more joint responsibility, can improve this. It is also important to develop a sense of relational legitimacy and satisfaction with the collaboration. Currently, everyone still largely works for themselves, but by working together on shared objectives with a clear division of roles, satisfaction with the joint operation can increase. The motivation and positive attitude of the individuals within the network are a strength, but this motivation can be further aligned with the shared objectives.
This requires agreements about the effective development of output within the network. Concrete goals must be set for the development of processes and products, such as alert systems, triage systems and feedback after handling a case. It is important to invest in procedures that make achievements possible, such as amended legislation that facilitates information exchange, as well as the ratification of the convention. Working groups can play an important role in this. Shared leadership is also crucial. The police are currently too central a leader and should be supported by other central actors, such as sports actors and gambling regulators. Shared and changing leadership can ensure that there is more and broader knowledge and expertise in the network and that responsibility is distributed more fairly.

It is also important to develop activities for knowledge building and to be more open to input from non-members, such as universities. There can also be more exchange with other actors within the Group of Copenhagen. Finally, resources, including logistical, human, financial and technical resources, must be shared within the network. A minimum of operating resources is necessary, as is a secretariat. External communication and awareness of the NP can be improved via, for example, a website.